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ABSTRACT 
Over the last few years, a significant amount of the effort of the 
Future Internet architecture is devoted in order to improve the 
scalability of the next generation routing architecture. In this paper, 
we study providers’ incentives to perform prefix aggregation or 
deaggregation of non-customers routes. This is essentially a trade-
off between reduced router memory and reduced capacity of 
attracting customer traffic.  We study the case where two ISPs 
compete for attracting traffic, by using game theory. In particular, 
we propose a game-theoretic model and we analyze the properties 
of the equilibrium. In a symmetric case, if a single Autonomous 
System (AS) is found to be deaggregating a given prefix, then all 
others will have the incentive to do the same, even if they end up 
with lower benefits. We find that pure equilibria do not always exist 
and we derive the conditions based on two model parameters. These 
findings suggest that BGP instability can be a common problem in a 
competitive scenario. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network 
Architecture and Design, J.4 [Social And Behavioral Sciences]: 
Economics 
General Terms: Design, Economics  
Keywords: Prefix aggregation, BGP, Multihoming, Incentives, 
Game theory, Future Internet 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Internet is one of the world’s most remarkable engineering and 
social phenomena. Despite its success, it has become a playground 
where stakeholders with conflicting interests interact with each 
other. These ongoing “tussles” may constitute a threat to the Future 
Internet [6]. 
The BGP global routing table is growing at a super-linear rate and it 
is uncertain whether the available technology will be able to cope 
with the expected growth rate, both in terms of size and update rate 
[9]. Even if it is feasible to produce routers that are able to handle 
the future global routing tables, the expected lifetime of deployed 
equipment may be significantly reduced and periodic router 
refreshes with new technology will be required to keep the Internet 
global routing system working [9]. This may significantly affect the 
economic viability of the Internet as we know it, since this reduction 
in the life-cycle of the deployed equipment may significantly 
increase the operator’s capital expenditure required. 
One may argue that Internet is a victim of its own success and this 
phenomenon is the consequence of the increasing number of new 
users. This can be partially attributed to the fact that the currently 
widely-used BGP-based multihoming technique [11] imposes that 
each mulithomed network contributes with an additional entry to the 
global routing table. While this is certainly true, there seems to be 
more to it than the growth due to more networks being reachable 
over the Internet. In particular, it can be observed that the BGP 
global routing table is growing much faster than the number of 
address blocks that are being allocated [8]. This basically means that 
when a new block is allocated, the increase of the global routing 
table is more than one route. So, when an address prefix is allocated 
from an Internet Registry, multiple routes covering different parts of 
the newly allocated address block are announced in BGP and 
populate the global routing tables. For example, it is possible to 
observe that about 50% of the entries of the current BGP global 
routing table correspond to the so-called more specific prefixes that 
are contained in other less specific prefixes, which are also present 
in the global routing tables [8]. Such behavior, that is called 
deaggregation, bloats the global routing table size, preventing the 
aggressive address aggregation capabilities of the current Classless 
Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) architecture, and severely reduces the 
routing system scalability. 
The reasons for the presence of these more specific prefixes in the 
global routing table have been studied, for instance in [8] and [1], 
and they include multihoming, traffic engineering and local routing 
policies. By announcing both the less specific prefix and a set of 
more specific prefixes, an AS can achieve powerful traffic 
engineering capabilities [11]. So, when a multihomed AS needs that 
a certain block of addresses is reachable over a certain ingress path, 
it can achieve so by announcing a route containing the more specific 
prefix corresponding to that address block through the target ingress 
link. The effect is that the traffic corresponding to that address block 
flows through the ingress link through which the route for the more 
specific prefix is announced. 
While the current practice of deaggregation has a significant 
detrimental effect on the routing system’s scalability as a whole, it 
does provide important benefits to the origin ASs that inject the 
more specific routes. Moreover, as this is a widely used technique, a 
given origin AS would hardly see any benefit in the form of routing 
table size reduction by suppressing its own routes, as long as the rest 
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of the other ASs still inject the routes corresponding to the more 
specific routes. So, it is pretty straightforward to conclude that an 
origin AS has incentive to continue announcing the more specific 
routes. A similar argument can be constructed for the transit 
providers of the origin AS that is injecting the more specific routes. 
Namely, the transit provider is charging the origin AS for its 
services, and due to the competition it has a strong incentive to 
honor the announcements of the origin AS. So, while the 
announcement of more specific prefixes bloats the transit provider 
routing table, it does obtain an economic profit out of it. Thus, the 
transit provider has a clear incentive to propagate the routes 
corresponding to the more specific prefixes to the rest of the 
Internet. 
However, as the relationship with the originating AS is more distant, 
the direct benefits of storing and propagating the more specific 
prefix routes are heavily reduced. In particular, if we consider an 
ISP that has not direct nor indirect commercial relationship with the 
originating AS (i.e. the ISP is not selling traffic to the originating 
AS, nor to any of its providers), the nature of the trade-off between 
storing and propagating the routes, containing the more specific 
prefixes and aggregating them, changes significantly. These ISPs do 
not get directly paid by a customer for propagating these more 
specific routes. The benefit they obtain is the indirect benefit of 
attracting more traffic, thanks to the longest-prefix match rule that 
will make the route through a more specific prefix more attractive 
than a less specific. 
A widely used approach to estimate the usage level of resources for 
long timescales (i.e. a month) when demand is bursty is the 95th 
percentile rule. In that case, the bandwidth used by a customer 
during a specific period (i.e. 10 minutes) is estimated and divided by 
the time period (in seconds) resulting in a single bps (bits per sec.) 
transfer measurement. At the end of the billing cycle period, all 
measurements are sorted in decreasing order and the top 5% of these 
measurements are thrown out. The next highest measurement is the 
95th percentile, and the customer will be billed based on that rate. 
The fact that providers’ revenues are based on the level of traffic 
creates an incentive to make the routes they advertise more 
attractive. This situation creates a trade-off between routing table 
scalability and service attractiveness; an AS has to make the choice 
between aggressive aggregation (which implies reduced routing 
table, hence reduced costs), and to propagate the routes containing 
the more specific prefixes (which increases the transit attractiveness, 
so increased revenues). In this paper, we attempt to characterize this 
trade-off and to provide some insight about when it is better for an 
ISP to aggregate and when it is better to propagate the more specific 
prefix routes. 
A significant amount of the effort of the Future Internet architecture 
is devoted to improve the scalability of the next generation routing 
architecture. It is essential to this task to have a deep understanding 
of the aggregation incentives that exist in the current Internet and 
use that knowledge as an input in the design of future architectures. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, we aim to provide 
some insights on the incentives for (de)aggregation in the current 
Internet routing system. Furthermore, we study the case where two 
ISPs compete for attracting traffic, by using game-theoretic 
modeling. We examine the properties of the game equilibria when 
providers decide what routes to propagate selfishly, and we derive 
conditions for the game equilibrium. Finally, we evaluate providers’ 
behaviour by estimating the variables of the above conditions. 
The paper is structured as follows. We give an overview of related 
work in Section 2 and give an estimation of possible benefits due to 
aggregation in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 describe the scenario we 
are interested in and the game theoretic model. We try to understand 
the current market situation in Section 6. Finally, we conclude and 
outline our future work in Section 7. 
2. RELATED WORK 
A recent strand of work in Internet routing treats ISPs as selfish 
economic entities who execute BGP so that they maximize their 
utility. The purpose is to study the properties of equilibria resulting 
from providers’ interaction and, if necessary, to suggest conditions 
and mechanisms that can achieve desirable outcomes. 
[4] and [2] identify conditions for stability of BGP when ISPs select 
outgoing paths towards a destination, based on a preference function 
of path desirability. Continuing this model, [7] proved that if the 
previous conditions hold and a domain can check whether packets 
follow the advertised path, then BGP is incentive-compatible. 
However, [3] concludes that this may not be the case if the 
preference function of ISPs is sensitive to the level of attracted 
traffic as well. For example, ISPs can have the incentive to advertise 
non-existing paths if traffic attraction and best path selection must 
be considered simultaneously. Furthermore, the authors of [3] look 
for policy conditions or additional tools that would render the option 
of lying useless, or in other words conditions for making truth-
telling the dominant strategy. 
[3] studies ISPs’ incentives to use BGP advertisements, in order to 
attract traffic from customers. The main difference from our work is 
that we focus on ISPs’ decision to aggregate (or not) a set of more 
specific prefixes they learned from a neighbour into a less specific 
one. This issue is explicitly out of the scope of the previous work. 
As mentioned before, prefix aggregation can significantly lower 
Tier-1 ISPs’ cost and at the best of our knowledge this is the first 
work to study providers’ incentives to use it. Besides, the longest-
prefix rule makes announcing more specific prefixes in competitive 
scenarios much more advantageous than simply manipulating path 
attributes (e.g. the AS-PATH). However, aggressive aggregation can 
be seen as a special type of lying; for example aggregating routes 
with different Origin AS may result in some destinations being 
unreachable. 
3. QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF 
AGGREGATION 
Aggregation reduces the size of the routing tables. Such reduction, 
not only results in reduced memory requirements on the routers but 
also, as the more specific prefixes tend to be much more flappy than 
the aggregated prefixes [8], aggregated routing tables also require 
less update processing from the routers. As a result, an AS that 
performs aggressive aggregation will see its capital expenditure 
costs reduced. In order to understand the benefits that can be 
obtained in terms of reduced routing table, we need first to precisely 
define how aggregation is performed.  
A conservative approach would to follow the one used by the CIDR 
report aggregation summary that aggregates routes containing the 
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exact same AS path, in order to honor transit policies. According to 
the CIDR report1, only doing that would reduce the size of the 
routing table in 40% (in July 2009). However, it would be possible 
to perform an even more aggressive aggregation strategy that would 
not respect the transit policies, but would preserve reachability. For 
instance, it would be possible to also aggregate routes which 
prefixes are susceptible to be aggregated in a less specific one and 
that contain the same origin AS (even if the routes differ in the AS 
path). According to [8], 50% of the routing tables correspond to 
more specific prefixes contained in less specific prefixes also 
present in the routing table. Of those, 44% of them the more specific 
prefix and the less specific prefix share the same origin AS. It would 
be possible to find even more aggressive rules that can preserve 
reachability, such as also aggregating routes that the AS path of the 
more specific prefix is fully contained in the AS path of the route of 
the less specific prefix. These correspond to 12% of the more 
specific prefixes contained in less specific prefix also present the 
routing table, according to [8]. 
Thus, using all the proposed aggregation rules would result in a 
reduction of the 50% of the BGP table size2. Since the current BGP 
table has about 300.000 entries3, the net reduction would be of 
150.000 entries. It is possible to actually quantify this cost 
reduction. According to [5], the cost of a route in the global routing 
table is 4 US cents per route per router per year4. The cost reduction 
that corresponds to this aggregation would be of 6.000 US per router 
per year. According to [5], the cost of the router capable of 
supporting the current global routing table is around 40.000 US, so 
aggregation would imply a 15% decrease in the router cost (if 
assumed linear). 
4. AN AS-ORIGIN DEAGGREGATION 
SCENARIO 
In Figure 1, we see a simple network topology composed of 6 ASs. 
AS1 and AS6 are retail multi-homed ISPs. AS2 and AS3 are Tier-2 
providers of AS1. A2 and AS3 have peering relationships with Tier-
2 providers AS4 and AS5. Finally, AS6 gets connectivity from both 
AS4 and AS5. 
Dashed arrows indicate the direction of BGP messages (blue 
rectangles) so that routing tables can be formed. We will describe 
the procedure for the prefix 163.144.0.0/23, which will allow data 
packets from customers of AS6 to be received by customers of AS1. 
Following a similar approach, AS1 would learn how to reach 
customers of AS6 (not described here). We should note that this is 
one realistic scenario, out of the many possible ones where the 
model of Section 5 applies.  
Figure 1 shows that in the beginning, only AS1 knows how to reach 
its customers. AS1 wants to perform traffic engineering and 
deaggregates his prefix 163.144.0.0/23 into 163.144.0.0/24 and 
163.144.1.0/24. The BGP advertisement message to AS2 contains 
                                                                 
1 http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/ 
2 This number includes the customer routes, so the actual 
reduction will be lower than this. 
3 http://bgp.potaroo.net/ 
4 This is calculated as “the portion of the router’ s cost attributable 
to the routing table divided by the expected deployment lifetime 
of the router in its DFZ (Default Free Zone) application divided 
by the total route count in the DFZ”. 
the route for the more specific prefix 163.144.0.0/24. Similarly, the 
BGP advertisement message to AS3 contains both the route for the 
more specific prefix 163.144.1.0/24, as well as the aggregated one. 
Namely, half of the more specific prefixes are advertised to AS2 and 
the rest half of them are advertised to AS3. Finally, the original 
prefix 163.144.0.0/23 is being advertised through both paths, as a 
backup solution. 
 
 
 
AS2 (and AS3 respectively) will run the route selection process and 
advertise the two routes learned from the previous step to each 
upstream provider AS4 and AS5. In this way, both AS4 and AS5 
will get the two routes containing the more specific prefixes and the 
route for the less specific prefix and they will have the option of 
aggregating them into a single route. 
In the following, we will concentrate on Tier-1 providers’ incentives 
(AS4 and AS5) to aggregate or not. This decision will depend on the 
trade-off between the marginal increase in cost and the marginal 
increase in revenues, due to deaggregation. Note that these costs and 
benefits may be stochastic. 
5. THE GAME AMONG TWO SYMMETRIC 
ISPS 
The setting where two transit ISPs, ASi and ASj, compete for 
attracting traffic can be studied by using game-theoretic modeling. 
In the simplest case, we can assume that all ISPs of the same tier are 
symmetric. This means that all competitors i) face similar routing 
management costs (for example they use similar router technology) 
and ii) have similar revenues (for example they have equal 
bargaining power and thus sign similar interconnection agreements 
with their customers and providers). 
For simplicity, we will assume that the Origin-AS ASo has just been 
allocated a single block of contiguous IP addresses, represented as 
B/mask. Furthermore, we will consider the case that traffic destined 
to this block has its source at a single Tier-1 ISP, called ASs. We 
plan to extend our model and capture bidirectional traffic, or traffic 
between several pairs of providers. However, we believe that the 
results will not differ significantly, under the assumption of 
symmetry. 
Let us suppose that ASo performs deaggregation of B/mask into 
more specific prefixes, in order to achieve better traffic engineering. 
ASi and ASj must decide what they will propagate to ASs, as soon as 
they receive the related BGP messages from their peers. Each one’s 
decision will be based on the incoming BGP messages (that are 
Figure 1. Topology of our scenario. 
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considered to be “common knowledge”) and on the possible action 
of the opponent. For simplicity, in this paper we study the “single-
shot” simultaneous-move game, where both providers act once and 
at the same time. 
5.1 Game Setup 
We aim to examine how much aggregation or deaggregation the 
players of the game will select to perform, for a given prefix B. This 
is called aggregation level and is denoted by li and lj respectively. 
In case of IPv4, the minimum aggregation level lmin for a provider is 
to propagate /32s. On the other hand, the maximum aggregation 
level lmax is variable, but for simplicity we will assume that it has a 
lower bound at 8, since the aggregation of multiple /8 does not seem 
likely. For the prefix B/mask, lmax is restricted to mask and thus li, lj 
є [lmax,lmin]. More aggressive behaviour (i.e. aggregate routes by 
violating the first condition) even though is possible, may result in 
some destinations being unreachable. In game-theoretic terms, li is 
the action space of ASi. 
We assume that transit providers ASi, ASj aim to maximize their 
profits and thus the “reaction function” of ASi (and respectively for 
ASj) is Πi(li,lj) = Ri(li,lj) – Ci(li). In particular, the profit Πi(li, lj) of 
ASi depends on the actions of both providers, and is the difference of 
the revenues Ri(li,lj) and the routing table cost Ci(li). More 
specifically, the revenues of ASi can be written as: 
Ri(li,lj) = rt2(lmin– lmax)Pi(li,lj), where 
• r is the average revenue from delivering one unit of traffic 
to a specific IP address. If an upstream provider charges 
his customers based on volume (i.e. by using the 95th 
percentile rule), r represents the price per traffic unit (i.e. 
cents per Mbps). We assume that the network is “neutral” 
which means that providers do not charge unilaterally, 
based on the recipient of traffic. 
• t is the average traffic delivered to a specific IP address. 
We assume for the time being that all IP addresses are 
symmetric with respect to the traffic these accept. 
• 2(lmin – lmax) refers to the number of IP addresses that are 
contained in the original prefix B/mask. 
• Pi(li,lj) denotes the probability of ASi being selected by 
ASs to carry traffic for IP addresses belonging in a specific 
prefix. 
We suppose that if a provider decides to deaggregate more (less 
aggregation level), he will be the one selected to transit traffic for 
the contained IP addresses. Contrarily, if a provider decides to 
aggregate more than the other one, he will lose all the traffic. This 
assumption can be attributed to the “longest-prefix” rule of BGP. 
Moreover, we assume that each provider will have equal chances of 
being selected when they select the same aggegation level. This 
means that:  
 
Furthermore, the cost related to the routing tables for ASi depends on 
the number of entries 2(li – lmax) being stored for the original prefix 
B/mask and on the cost for each entry k. We assume that the 
memory cost attributed to each stored route k is constant, for any 
given router. For simplicity, we also assume that there is enough 
free memory to store routes for the original prefix B/mask, even if 
the li = lmin, and that all entries have equal memory requirements. 
Note that Ci(li) depends only on the aggregation level of ASi, and 
can be written as Ci(li) = 2(li – lmax)k. 
5.2 Game Equilibria 
Continuing our scenario, we suppose that B/mask = 163.144.0.0/23 
and ASo deaggregates into 163.144.0.0/24 and 163.144.1.0/24. For 
illustrative purposes, let us examine a simpler case and try to 
generalize later. Suppose that transit providers ASi and ASj have a 
restricted action space; that is li, lj є [23,25]. Thus, we have the 
following cases: 
• li < lj , for example participants play (li ,lj) = (23,25) 
• li = lj , for example (li ,lj) = (23,23) 
• li > lj , for example (li ,lj) = (24,23) 
Assuming that t = 1, the payoff matrix of this simple game is given 
by the Table 1. In this table, each cell (li,lj) has two values separated 
by a comma. The first value is the net benefit of participant ASi 
when he plays li and his opponent plays lj. Respectively, the second 
value is the net benefit of participant ASj. 
Table 1. Example payoff matrix 
ASj 
 
23 24 25 
23 2
8r – k, 
28r – k 
– k, 
29r – 2k  
– k, 
29r – 4k 
24 2
9r – 2k, 
– k 
28r – 2k, 
28r – 2k 
– 2k,    
29r – 4k ASi 
25 2
9r – 4k, 
– k 
29r – 4k, 
– 2k 
28r – 4k, 
28r – 4k 
 
In that case, the best strategy5 for both transit ISPs is the same (due 
to symmetry) and depends on the actual values of r and k. More 
specifically, the best pure strategy li* of ASi can be written as: 
if r < k2–8 then  
li* = 23 
else if k2–8 < r < 2k2–8 then  
li* = 24 
else if r > 3k2–8 then  
li* = 25 
end if 
                                                                 
5 Strategies are detailed planned actions that take into account 
previous or anticipated responses from other players. At each 
stage of the game, players will pick actions from their strategy, 
depending on the information they gathered. 
( ) ( ) ( )
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The above conditions emerged by solving for the values of r that 
make a specific aggregation level the best reply for both players. 
When both providers decide to choose the same aggregation level 
(the diagonal of the payoff matrix), then they would expect to have 
the same revenues. However, the more they deaggregate, the less 
profits both providers have. That happens because if the aggregation 
level equals 23 the cost equals k. On the other hand, if the 
aggregation level equals 24 or 25 the cost will be 2k and 4k 
respectively. 
Thus, if r > 3k2-8 or k2-8 < r < 2k2-8, both transit providers have the 
incentive to deaggregate. This behaviour is optimal for the selfish 
providers, because if a single one decided to aggregate, he would 
not attract any traffic for that prefix. But it is not socially optimum 
since, e.g. in the first case 2(28 r – 3k) < 2(28 r – k). This situation is 
known as the prisoners’ dilemma6. On the other hand, if r < k2-8, the 
routing memory unit cost is too high and both providers are better 
off by aggregating. In that case, the pure strategy equilibrium 
outcome is socially optimum also. 
Note that there are some combinations of r and k where no pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium exists. This happens either when r = k2-8 
or when 2k2-8 ≤ r ≤ 3k2-8. In the former case, each ISP is indifferent 
between the two aggregation levels, regardless of the opponent’s 
choice. In the latter case, there is no dominant strategy because any 
possible outcome is outweighed by at least another one. This 
situation is depicted in the Figure 2 where ASj has to decide his best 
aggregation level l'j by considering any possible action from ASi. 
Even though we study the single-shot game, participants are 
assumed to be clever enough to take into account anticipated 
opponent actions in the future. Each circle represents a possible 
outcome (best responses from a player), where the first value refers 
to the li and the second to lj chosen respectively. The aggregation 
level which is shown as bold represents the best response of the 
respective player. Slim arrows represent the first move of ASi, while 
thick arrows denote how the game would be played by transitioning 
from one outcome to another. 
 
Figure 2. An example of no Pure Nash Equillibrium. 
Assuming in our example that r = k2-8, if li = 23, the best response 
from ASj would be l'j = 24. Expecting this rational response from 
ASj, ISP ASi would respond by setting l'i = 25. Applying this logic 
                                                                 
6 In this game, the “dilemma” faced by the prisoners (the ISPs 
respectively, in our example) is that, whatever the other does, 
each is better off confessing than remaining silent. However, the 
outcome obtained when both prisoners confess (both ISPs 
deaggregate) is worse for each than the outcome they would 
have obtained if both had remained silent (both ISPs aggregate). 
repeatedly, we see that no player will ever stop responding. Thus, 
there is no equilibrium because each provider is willing to 
deaggregate at the maximum allowed level, in order to attract 
traffic. However, if both providers act aggressively, their cost will 
exceed revenues (since traffic will be split and cost will be 
increased). Consequently, whenever one ISP selects the maximum 
deaggregation level, the opponent’s best response is the minimum 
deaggregation level. Intermediate levels only increase the cost, due 
to longest-prefix rule. But, in that case 23 < l'i < 25 since saving 
router memory increases profit. This in turn allows ASj to attract 
traffic by selecting the maximum deaggregation level, resulting in 
an unstable environment. 
These results can be generalized for the case where li, lj є [lmax,lmin]. 
In particular, following a similar procedure, we find that for any α є 
[0,φ+1], where φ = lmin – lmax – 1, the pure strategy equilibrium is: 
if 0 ≤ α < φ + 1 then 
 
 
 
else if α = φ + 1 then 
  
end if 
where (Ø,Ø) denotes that no pure equilibrium aggregation level 
exists. An example scenario when φ = 8 and lmax = 23 is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. An example of possible equillibria. 
6. ESTIMATING THE PARAMETER r 
So far, we have proposed a model that captures the trade-off 
between the added revenue resulting from announcing a route 
containing a more specific prefix and the associated cost in terms of 
capital expenditure in router equipment. In this section, we will 
propose a model for estimating the parameter r of the model 
described in Section 5. r is the average revenues per month from 
delivering one unit of traffic to a specific IP address in a given 
prefix contained in a route. The goal is to apply the results of 
Section 5 and determine the aggregation level at the equilibrium in a 
scenario that approaches reality. Note that our aim during 
estimations is to find the order of magnitude, instead of the exact 
calculation. 
As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that the revenue 
associated to a particular route announcement depends, among other 
parameters, of the charging model of the ISP and the traffic that 
each client sends to the particular set of destinations contained in the 
prefix of the announced route. All this data is available to the ISP 
itself, so it should be possible for each ISP to apply the proposed 
model and determine for each prefix that is susceptible to be 
aggregated, i.e. whether the revenue resulting from announcing the 
route is worth the cost of storing the route in the routing table. In 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
α α
φ φ
αα
φ φ
+
⎧ −+ + < <⎪⎪= ⎨ −⎪ ∅ ∅ ≤ ≤⎪⎩
max max
* *
1
2 1 2,
2 2,
2 12,
2 2
i j
k kl a l a if r
t tl l
kkif r
t t
( ) ( ) ( )α φ−= + + <* * max max 2 1, , 2i j kl l l a l a if rt
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order to do so, the ISP needs to quantify the amount of traffic sent to 
the target prefix, calculate the traffic reduction that would imply not 
to announce the route for the more specific and evaluate the cost / 
revenue trade-off. 
We will estimate r by relying on the fact that most ISPs charge their 
customers based on volume. We assume the traffic of an ISP is 
uniformly distributed across all the IP addresses. While this 
assumption is clearly unrealistic, it may be useful as a first 
approximation. Moreover, since we are dealing with prefixes rather 
than with single IP addresses, this approximation is likely to 
improve significantly with respect to the single IP address case. 
So, if an ISP is selling b units of transit bandwidth each month, and 
if we call n the total number of IP addresses that are reachable using 
routes contained in the global routing table, then each address is 
sinking b/n units of transit bandwidth. If we call t to the price 
charged by the ISP per month per unit of transit traffic, then the 
revenue r per month resulting from announcing such address in the 
more specific route can be calculated as: r = tb/n. 
Following [10] let us suppose that the Internet market is composed 
of 10 Tier-1 ISPs, 1,000 Tier-2 ISPs and 5,000 Tier-3 ISPs, that t = 
10 US dollars per month per Mbps and b = 1680 Mbps. 
Furthermore, we assume that each Tier-2 ISP has 3 upstream 
providers and that all Tier-1 ISPs have the same market share. This 
means that each Tier-1 ISP transits b/3 Mbps for each of his 300 
customers. The number of allocated number of IPv4 addresses has 
been estimated to be n = 3,706,650,6247, (July 2009). Thus r = 
0.0062, which means that no pure equilibrium would exist since 2φrt 
= 15.79 that lies between [2αk, (2a+1 – 1)k] for a = 8 and when k = 
0.04. This suggests that stability of BGP due to prefix deaggregation 
can be a realistic problem. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have analyzed providers’ incentives to perform aggregation and 
deaggregation of non-customers routes. This is essentially a trade-
off between reduced router memory (which results in reduced costs) 
and reduced capacity of attracting customer traffic (which results in 
reduced revenues).  We proposed a game theoretic model and we 
analyzed the properties of the equilibrium, when there is one.  We 
have found that, in a symmetric case, if a single AS deaggregates a 
prefix, then all others ISPs will have an incentive to do so, even if 
they end up with lower benefit. We found that pure equilibria do not 
always exist and we have derived the conditions that are based on 
two model parameters; the cost associated to additional memory 
caused by deaggregation and the revenue obtained from announcing 
a route containing a more specific prefix. We conclude that BGP 
instability can be a frequent problem in a competitive scenario. 
We plan to extend our model by introducing asymmetry in terms of 
traffic volume that is being originated or accepted by IP addresses. 
Since ISPs have the necessary information, they could solve a profit 
maximization problem, in order to select the optimum aggregation 
level for each IP address. 
Exchange of BGP messages usually happens asynchronously and 
iteratively. Thus, a repeated-game formulation would achieve a 
more realistic representation of the situation. We would like to 
examine if there is a trade-off between profit maximizing strategies 
                                                                 
7  http://www.bgpexpert.com/addressespercountry.php 
and BGP stability. For example, if strategies like “Deaggregate one 
level if opponent is not maximum aggressive, otherwise aggregate at 
the maximum level” proved to be optimal, they could lead to 
instability. 
In addition, we are working in improved means to estimate the 
revenue r that removes the assumption that traffic is uniformly 
distributed across the IP address space announced in the BGP 
routing table. In particular, we are considering a model that 
proposes an inverse relationship between the amount of traffic that a 
given route sinks and the AS path length attribute. The intuition 
behind this assumption is that popular destinations are closer, as a 
result of peering incentives and content distribution networks. 
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